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CHAPTER X Intellectual Property and Competition Law 




The inception of a modern and codified set of rules of Competition law in the United 
Kingdom has been introduced with the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry 
and Control) Act 1948.1 Having said that, it must however be mentioned that issues 
relating to monopoly power have already been addressed in English law for a thou-
sand years.2 An important historical development in the history of English and later 
British Competition Law – arguably as well for the development of the interface of 
competition and IP law generally - was related to addressing trade privileges granted 
by the Crown. Such trade privileges or litterae patentes were initially provided to in-
troduce new manufacture into the realm by providing foreign manufacturers with the 
exclusive ability to work in England. By the times of the Tudors and Stewarts these 
privileges were increasingly provided to reward the Sovereign’s favourites3 rather 
than to attract and reward new enterprise. This led to privileges over trivial subject 
matter such as playing cards.4 
 
∗ PhD, LL.M. (University of London). 
My thanks go to Dr Amir Nabil and  Stylianos Alexandridis for their useful comments, ideas and sug-
gestions in relation to this chapter. 
1 Andrew Scott, The Evolution of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom, (LSE Law, So-
ciety and Economy Working Papers 9/2009) 6; Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition 
Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC (Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 5; Butterworths Competi-
tion Law, Division 1, [590] (Issue 103); D.M. Raybould and Alison Firth, Law of Monopolies – 
Competition Practice in the USA, EEC, Germany and the UK (Graham & Trotman 1991) 434.  
Rodger and MacCulloch however refer to the Profiteering Act 1919 as the first competition-related 
statute in the United Kingdom – Barry J Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, Competition Law and 
Policy in the EU and UK (5th ed, Routledge 2015) 23. 
2 Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 5. 
3 Terrell on Patents (17th edn, Sweet& Maxwell 2010) [1-08]. 
4 Darcy v Allin (1602) 11 Co.Rep.846. In this case the monopoly granted to Edward Darcy for import-
ing and selling playing cards was invalidated and is commonly referred to as the “Case of Mo-
nopolies”. 
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Parliament was growing increasingly discontent with this system of patronage by the 
Sovereign.5 In response, the Book of Bounty, a proclamation of King James I, aimed 
at delineating between useful and harmful monopolies.6 Finally, the Statute of Mo-
nopolies was passed 1623 by Parliament.7 Its Article 1 abolished all monopolies with 
the prominent exclusion of patent rights8 and addressed the abuses of the privilege 
systems that were available at these times. While the privilege system that was enter-
tained by the English and later British monarchs cannot be fully regarded as contem-
porary IP rights, this early legislative Act is remarkable as it would serve as a 
guideline for the relationship of competition and intellectual property protection. Con-
temporary UK Competition Law still embraces the tension created by IP rights for 
competition. Since the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic 
Communities in 1973, UK Competition Law is heavily influenced by EU rules. The 
UK Competition law rules, its practice and enforcement are therefore to a large degree 
based on European principles.  
 
This chapter will first introduce the pertinent legislation with regards to the main in-
tellectual property rights as well as UK Competition law. Then, the law with regards 
to several intersections between intellectual property and competition law will be ana-
lysed with reference to the UK practice. These examples refer to issues in relation to 
licencing of IP rights, the refusal to licence such rights as an abuse of a dominant po-
sition as well as issues in relation to settlement and delimitation agreements. 
 
 
5 Famously, Sir Francis Bacon held a speech before the House of Commons where he alluded the bene-
fit of monopolies for inventions while highlighting the necessity of distinguishing them from other 
harmful monopolies - Friedrich-Karl Beier, ‘Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Patentschutz - Zur ge-
schichtlichen Entwicklung des deutschen Patentrechts’ [GRUR 1978] 123, 125. 
6 The Book of Bounty declared grants of patents for existing industries to be illegal  - Neil Davenport, 
The United Kingdom Patent System – A brief History (Kenneth Mason 1979) 19; Klaus Boehm, 
The British Patent System – I. Administration (1967 Cambridge University Press) 16. 
7 21 Jac 1, c 3. 
8 See Section 6 Statute of Monopolies. The “true and first inventor” of new and industrially applicable 
was awarded with a patent with up to14 years of which then constituted 2 terms of apprenticeship. 
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1.1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Intellectual Property law in the United Kingdom is nowadays widely codified similar-
ly to other European jurisdictions. Some areas that relate to intellectual property law 
however remain to be uncodified case law which was developed by the courts, such as 
the tort of passing off or the action against breach of confidence.  The following para-
graphs will however display the main codified IP rights in the United Kingdom such 
as patents, copyright and trade marks by way of introduction. 
 
1.1.1. Patent Law 
 
The UK Patents Act 1977 is the major piece of legislation governing the law of pa-
tents in the United Kingdom. While UK Patents can be obtained through the European 
and international avenues they can be obtained through the national route.  Such ap-
plication for the grant of a British patent must be filed with the UK Intellectual Prop-
erty Office (UKIPO) 9 in Newport pursuant to Section 14 UK Patents Act 1977. The 
decisions taken by the UK IPO can be appealed against before the Patent Court which 
is a specialised branch of the High Court of England and Wales.10  
 
UK Patents can be enforced before the Patents Court. The UK Intellectual Property 
Enterprise Court (IPEC) which was previously known as the UK Patents County 
Court can also hear cases that relate to smaller claims and can award damages up to 
£500.000,-. The IPEC can also hear cases in relation to copyright, designs and trade 
marks, amongst others. As such, the IPEC is more and more becoming an attractive 
forum for patent litigation as well as litigation of other IP rights because it is suitable 
for small and medium enterprises. Unlike, Germany with its system of bifurcation, 
British judges can hear and decide on matters in relation to infringement and validity 
of patents.  Remedies in patent infringement proceedings include the claim to injunc-
 
9 UK Intellectual Property Office has been the operating name of the UK Patent Office since 2007. 
10 Section 97 Patents Act 1977. 
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tive relief (Section 61 (1) (a) UK Patents Act 1977) and in case of negligent or inten-
tional behaviour the compensation of damages (Section 61 (1) (c) with Section 62 UK 
Patents Act 1977).  
 
1.1.2 Copyright Law 
 
The Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988 (CDPA 1988) is the main codification 
with regards to copyright law. It provides copyright protection for literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic works (i.e. authorial works)11 as well as for entrepreneurial works. 
Importantly, the CPDA 1988 operates a so-called closed list of works that can be pro-
tected through copyright. If a work cannot be subsumed under a category as provided 
by the CDPA 1988 copyright does not subsist in that work.12 
 
 In comparison to some authors’ rights jurisdictions, copyright can be fully or partly 
assigned or licensed.13 In the case of a full assignment the assignee becomes the own-
er of the copyright. A transfer of ownership however does not occur in the case where 
the copyright is licensed but the grant of an exclusive license will often be regarded as 
being equivalent to an assignment.14 Where a work is created in the course of em-
ployment the employer will generally become the owner of the copyright in the work 
created by the employee.15 
 
While British copyright law does not require any form of registration for copyright to 
subsist in a work, there is the requirement of the work being fixated in any tangible 
form.16 The copyright in authorial works and films expires after 70 years after the 
 
11 Section 1(1)(a) CDPA 1988. 
12 See for instance the infamous case in relation to the question whether the arrangement that ultimately 
resulted in the cover photograph of the album “Be here now” by the English band “Oasis” could be 
protected under UK copyright law - Creation Records v Newsgroup Newspapers [1997] E.M.L.R. 
444. 
13 Section 90 CDPA 1988. 
14 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 296. 
15 Section 11 (2) CDPA 1988. 
16 Section 3 (2), (3) CDPA 1988. 
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death of the author17 while it is shorter for other works. The infringement of copyright 
can be heard before the civil courts and can lead to various remedies such as injunc-
tive relief, damages, account of profits, delivery and destruction of infringing goods. 
 
1.1.3 Trade Mark Law 
 
The main act with regards to trade mark law in the United Kingdom is the UK Trade 
Marks Act 1994. This piece of legislation is based upon the Trade Mark Directive18 
which harmonised national trade mark laws within the states of the European Union. 
The UK Trade Marks Act 1994 governs the substantive and procedural law of obtain-
ing trade mark registration in the United Kingdom. National trade marks may be reg-
istered at the UKIPO or can also be protected without being registered if they are 
well-known according to Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. Trade mark infringe-
ment can be enforced before the civil courts and remedies such as injunctive relief, 
damages, account of profits and delivery up and destruction may be obtained.  
 
1.2 COMPETITION LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Contemporary Competition Law in the United Kingdom is regulated by two major 
pieces of legislation – The Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002. Before 
that British Competition Law was governed by a set of “a mosaic of complex provi-
sions“19 which was “developed in a piecemeal fashion.”20 This development “was 
criticised for being ineffective in deterring anti-competitive behaviour”.21 As men-
tioned, modern competition law was introduced with the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948.22 This Act established the Monopolies and 
 
17 Section 12 & 13B (2) CDPA 1988. 
18 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approx-
imate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks. 
19 Butterworths Competition Law, Division 1, [591] (Issue 103). 
20  Peter Freeman and Richard Whish, Butterworths Competition Law (Special Bulletin) – A Guide to 
the Competition Act 1998 (Butterworths 1999) 1. 
21 Butterworths Competition Law, Division 1, [591] (Issue 103). 
22  supra fn 1. 
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Restrictive Practices Commission23 to which the Secretary of State could refer “mo-
nopoly situations”. Since its focus was largely related to addressing such situations, 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 was legislated in order to target horizontal 
agreements. A system of controlling mergers was established with the Fair Trading 
Act 1973. This Act also established the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), headed by the 
Director-General of Fair Trading, which was largely free of political control.24 The 
Competition Act 1980 made it possible to scrutinise the actions of public bodies.25 
 
However, European integration26 has meant that the UK Competition Law needed to 
be amended. This was achieved with the Competition Act 1998. The Act repealed 
many pieces of legislation concerned with competition law such as the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1976, the Restrictive Practices Court Act 1976, the Resale Prices 
Act 1976, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 197727 and most parts of the Competi-
tion Act 1980.28 The substantive provisions of the Act have been modelled according 
to Article 101 and 102 TFEU. The so-called Chapter I prohibitions29 which follow the 
template of Article 101 TFEU are therefore aimed against “agreements etc. prevent-




23 The powers of the Commission was limited as it only could examine situations and provide recom-
mendations after the Secretary of State referred a “monopoly situation” for its scrutiny. 
 The Commission was subsequently renamed into the Monopolies Commission, the Monopolies 
and Merger Commission and into the Competition Commission pursuant to Section 45 (3) Compe-
tition Act 1998.  
24 The Act also enabled the OFT in person of its General Director to refer monopoly situations to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission aside the Secretary of State - Robert Merkin and Karen Wil-
liams, Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC (Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 17 -
18. 
25 David Parker, Reforming Competition Law in the UK: The Competition Act 1998 (University of Bath 
Occasional Paper March 2000)  1 –  
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/Occasional_Papers/14_Parker.pdf,  
<last accessed: 16.11.2015> 
26 The United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community in 1973. 
27 Section 1 Competition Act 1998. 
28 Section 17 Competition Act 1998. 
29 Sections 2-16 Competition Act 1998. 
30 Section 2 (1) Competition Act 1998. 
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Similarly to Article 102 TFEU, the provisions of Chapter II of the Competition Act 
1998 prohibit an abuse of a dominant position.31 Subsection 2 of Article 18 provides 
for a non-exhaustive list of actions that may be considered to be such an abuse which 
repeats the exact wording of Article 102 TFEU. While there is no de minimis rule as 
laid out in Article 102 TFEU, Section 40 of the Competition Act 1998 provides for an 
immunity from penalties (not of substance) if the abusive conduct is only “of minor 
significance.” 32 
 
Article 60 (1) of the Competition Law Act 1998 ensures that UK Competition Law is 
applied with an approach consistent with the Competition practice in the European 
Union. It provides that the questions in relation to competition covered under the first 
5 chapters of the Competition Act 1998 are dealt with in a manner corresponding to 
those “arising under Community Law in relation to competition within the Communi-
ty.” This however does not stipulate that UK Competition law fully applies EU Com-
petition Law but rather that inconstancies are to be avoided.33 It has however been 
said that the application of this provision did not provide for difficulties with regards 
to substantive competition law.34 
 
Additionally, the Enterprise Act 2002 brought important changes to UK Competition 
Law. It made changes to role of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) while also abolish-
ing the Office of Director General of Fair Trading.35 Final decisions on mergers and 
market investigation were now made by independent authorities and did not require 
ministerial action.36 The Act also introduced criminal sanctions for individuals who 
were found to be engaged with hard-core cartels.37 Additionally, Section 12(1) of the 
 
31 Sections 18 - 24 Competition Act 1998. 
32 The threshold has been set at £ 50 million – Section 4 Competition Act 1998 (Small Agreements and 
Conduct of Minor Significance) Regulations 2000, SI 2002/262. 
33 Steve Anderman, ‘The Competition Act 1998 and Intellectual Property Rights’ in Barry J. Rodger 
and Angus MacCulloch, The UK Competition Act – A New Era for UK Competition Law (Hart 
Publishing 2000) 198.  
34 Ben Rayment, ‘The Consistency Principle: Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998’ in Barry J. 
Rodger (ed), Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee University Press 2010) 82. 
35 Section 1 Enterprise Act 2002. 
36 This was meant to depoliticise UK Competition Law - Barry J Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, 
Competition Law and Policy in the EU and UK (5th ed, Routledge 2015) 27. 
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Act also established the Competition Appeal Tribunal which has the function as an 
appellate court in competition law matters.38 
 
Currently, Competition Law is enforced by the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA). This authority was established by the recently enacted Enterprise and Regula-
tory Reform Act 2013. This piece of legislation pooled the functions of the former 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) with the Competition Commission39 in the new admin-
istrative body of the CMA.40  
 
2. TRANSFER OF IP RIGHTS 
The current layout of the Competition Act 1998 mirroring the provisions of Article 
101 and 102 TFEU means that similar considerations apply to the transfer of IP rights 
in UK Competition Law as to the Union level. This means that where an agreement 
would fall under the scrutiny of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, similar considerations 
apply in the Chapter I and II prohibitions of the Competition Act 1998. This is, as al-
ready mentioned, enhanced through Section 60 of the Competition Act 1998 so con-
siderations made with this regard on EU level will also apply in domestic UK law.41  
An obvious and important distinction however is that UK Competition Law scrutinis-
es the effects of such agreements or practices on the trade in the United Kingdom ra-
ther than the whole Union.42 Having said that, Regulation 1/2003 (the so-called 
Modernisation Regulation) which was implemented by the Competition Act 1998 and 
Other Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 2004 does enable the relevant British 
authorities (i.e. now the CMA) to enforce Article 101 and 102 TFEU in the United 
Kingdom.43 
 
37 See Part 6 (Sections 188-202) of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
38 See Part 2 (Sections 12-21) of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
39 The Competition Commission was labelled differently during the course of the years - supra fn 23.  
40 Cosmo Graham, ‘The Reform of UK Competition Policy’ [European Competition Journal 2012] 554. 
41Butterworths Competition Law, Division 5, [22] (Issue 103). 
42 Section 2(1) Competition Act 1998; Butterworths Competition Law, Division 1, [602] (Issue 103). 
43 Section 3 Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 2004. 
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The fact that IP licensing agreements now fall under the scrutiny of Chapter I and II 
of the Competition Act 1998 marks a substantial change in the UK practice. The tradi-
tional approach under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 towards such agree-
ments was rather benign44  or lax.45 This was because they were considered to be 
providing a freedom that would - due to the exclusive nature of the right - otherwise 
not exists.46 The former OFT provided draft guidelines with regards to the licensing 
of IP rights47 which however have subsequently been withdrawn. 48 The current Com-





2.1 AGREEMENTS REGARDING THE SALE OR LICENSING OF PATENTS  
 
 
44 Paul M. Taylor, E.C. & U.K. Competition Law & Compliance: A practical Guide (Sweet & Maxwell 
1999) [9-02]. 
45 Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 326. 
46 Paul M. Taylor, E.C. & U.K. Competition Law & Compliance: A practical Guide (Sweet & Maxwell 
1999) [9-02].  
This can be traced back to the Ravenseft case (Ravenseft v Director-General of Fair Trading [1977] All 
ER 47) where it was held that receiving a lease or property entailing certain conditions as to the 
use ought not to be perceived as a restriction. Rather, it should be perceived as grant of right which 
would otherwise not have been available in an unrestricted form. In other words, through the ac-
ceptance of these perceived restrictions the recipient would not lose any pre-existing freedom. 
Transposed to intellectual property this would mean that “an intellectual property licence does not 
impose “restrictions” but merely makes a qualified grant of new rights to exploit otherwise pro-
tected privileges.” - Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the 
UK and the EEC (Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 296-297. 
47 Intellectual property rights, a draft Competition Act 1998 Guideline, November 2001, OFT 418. 
48 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, OUP 2015) 861 in fn. 341. 
49 It has been said that the previous OFT did not provide for new guidelines due to the comprehensive-
ness of the EU guidelines - Butterworths Competition Law, Division 5, [25] (Issue 103). These 
considerations may also have led the current CMA not to provide for domestic guidelines. 
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As mentioned, the introduction of the Competition Act 1998 changed the UK regime 
of IP licensing. The previously applicable Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 hardly 
applied to licensing agreements as it provided for a wide set of exemptions for licens-
es involving IP rights.50 Currently, the Chapter I provisions are applicable to licenses 
in relation to patent rights. Section 70 of the Competition Act 1998 specifically re-
pealed Sections 4451 and 4552 of the UK Patents Act 1977. This emphasises that the 
British legislator felt that the provisions of the Competition Act 1998 would be fully 
adequate to address such occurrences.53 
A patent licence will not fall under a Chapter I violation where it does not appreciably 
affect competition as Section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 states. Additionally, a 
small agreement in the reading of Section 39(1) of the Competition Act 1998 which is 
not a price fixing agreement may benefit from immunity from fines. The UK does not 
as such provide for a block exemption for technology transfers. Section 10 of the 
Competition Act 1998 however provides a so-called parallel exemption. This means 
that any agreement that falls within the Technology Transfer Block Exemption regula-
tion (TTBER)54, therefore exempting the agreement from an Article 101 TFEU viola-
tion, will also be exempted from a Chapter I violation.55 Finally, the Competition Act 
1998 provides a similar rule to Article 101(3) TFEU in its Section 9. Where the 4 cri-
teria are provided cumulatively an agreement is also not prohibited.  
 
 
50 Steve Anderman, “The Competition Act 1998 and Intellectual Property Rights” in Barry J. Rodger 
and Angus MacCulloch, The UK Competition Act – A New Era for UK Competition Law (Hart 
Publishing 2000) 198. 
51 The provision was aimed at prohibiting tying-in clauses in in a patent license or assignment 
52 The provision provided a statutory right to terminate licence after the expiry or revoked of the patent. 
53 Martin Coleman and Michael Grenfell, The Competition Act 1998 - Law and Practice (OUP 1999) 
[7.123]. 
54 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agree-
ments. 
55 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th ed, OUP 2015) 851. 
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2.2 AGREEMENTS REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF TRADEMARKS AND 
COPYRIGHTS 
 
Agreements relating to the transfer of trade marks and copyright may violate a Chap-
ter I prohibition when the requirements of Section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 are 
fulfilled.  The pertinent approach taken within the European framework will be appli-
cable to the UK framework due to the consistency provision of Section 60 of the 
Competition Act 1998. It is important to mention that the European Union did not 
provide for a specific Block Exemption regulation with regards to trade mark licens-
ing agreements. The Regulation also only relates to copyright licenses where they re-
late to software. The TTBER generally only privileges a licensing agreement of 
technology rights which does not include trade mark rights or copyright apart from 
computer software. Such agreements will only fall within the scope of the TTBER 
where such agreements are ancillary to a tech-transfer agreement.56 Where this is the 
case the effect of the Block Exemption even applies where it is deemed to be not ap-
plicable due to insufficient effect on trade between EU Member States.  
The previous Monopolies and Mergers Commission provided some case law with re-
gards to copyright licensing agreements which are worth noting. In the Collective Li-
censing57 case it scrutinised the practice of the Phonographic Performance Limited 
(PLC), a collecting society, under the Fair Trading Act 1973. The Commission was 
specifically asked to assess the practice of licensing between the holders of copyright 
and the collecting society as well as question with regards to royalties and restrictions 
to performance. It held that that collecting licensing is generally the best method to 
govern the licensing of sound recording and hence not contrary to the public interest. 
It however provided its finding on how the licensing agreements the collecting society 
should operate. In the Video Games58 case the Commission found that the practice by 
Nintendo and Sega in granting licences in their software copyright to independent 
 
56 Article 2(3) COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technol-
ogy transfer agreements. 
57 Collective licensing; a report of certain practices in the collective licensing of public performance 
and broadcasting rights in sound recordings (1988) (Cm 530). 
58 Video Games (1995) Cmnd 2781. 
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software publishers had the effect of raising prices for the end consumers. It looked at 
issues such as restriction of publishers as to how many games they were able to pro-
duce as well as the necessity that the manufacture of the game cartridges is arranged 
by either Sega or Nintendo.59 
 
2.3 TRANSFER OF IP RIGHTS AND MERGER CONTROL 
Intellectual property rights can be a substantial part of mergers of undertakings. The 
fact that the merged entity holds these rights could have repercussions for competition 
and hence falls under the scrutiny of competition law. The Enterprise Act 2002 is the 
main legal basis regarding merger control in the United Kingdom. Its enforcement is 
now solely conducted by the CMA. The authority will assess merger situations which 
are deemed to exist “where two or more enterprises cease to be distinct and either the 
UK turnover of the acquired enterprise exceeds £70 million or the two enterprises 
supply or acquire at least 25 per cent of the same goods or services supplied in the UK 
(or a substantial part of it) and the merger increases that share of supply.”60 
As such, the process of merger control in the UK is conducted in two stages. In the 
first stage (the “Phase 1” investigation), an initial review is launched assessing wheth-
er there are prima-facie competition concerns while the second stage (the “Phase 2” 
investigation) involves a more in depth analysis. If the CMA comes to the conclusion 
that the merger entails a “substantial lessening of competition,”61 the CMA has certain 
remedies to address this issues ranging from prohibiting the merger or requiring a di-
vesture of parts of the business. 
 
 
59 Butterworths Competition Law, Division 1, [979] (Issue 103). 
60 Competition and Markets Authority, A Quick Guide to UK Merger Assessment (March 2014) CMA 
18. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/288677/CMA18_A_quic
k_guide_to_UK_merger_assessment.pdf  <last accessed: 23.11.2015> 
61 Section 22 (1) (b) Enterprise Act 2002. 
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With regards to intellectual property rights, the licensing or assignment of intellectual 
property rights are considered a special form of asset divestiture that the CMA can 
use.62 Both measures can apply in order to remedy the merger situation. Licensing 
alone will however only be regarded as leading to a substantial lessening of competi-
tion where it is “sufficient to enhance significantly the acquirer’s ability to compete 
with the merger parties.”63 Where this remedy does not promise to alleviate the situa-
tion a divesture is preferred to the licensing of IP rights.64 This approach can be seen 
for instance in Tetra Laval/CPS65 and Thermo Electron Manufacturing/GV Instru-
ments66  - the latter case being an example of how the former Competition Commis-









62 Thomas Hoehn and Suzanne Rab, ‘UK Merger Remedies: Convergence or Conflict with Europe? A 
Comparative Assessment of Remedies in UK mergers’ [2009 ] European Competition Law Review 
87. 
63 Competition Commission, Merger Remedies: Competition Commission Guidelines (November 2008) 
CC8 [3.29]. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284415/cc8.pdf  
<last accessed: 23.11.2015> 
64 ibid 3.30.  
65 Tetra Laval/CPS, decision by the OFT of November 20, 2006. 
66 Thermo Electron Manufacturing/GV Instruments, decision by the CC of July 31, 2007. 
67 Competition Commission, Merger Remedies: Competition Commission Guidelines (November 
2008) CC8 [3.29]. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284415/cc8.pdf  
<last accessed: 23.11.2015> 
DAC18684536/1   IPT-000039 
 
 
 Seite 14  
2.4  REFUSAL TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS   
Similar to the situation in other jurisdiction, the question whether a refusal to licence 
intellectual property rights violates competition law in form of an abuse of dominance 
plays a major role in the discussion on the interplay of IP and competition law in the 
United Kingdom. The effect of the European framework which discusses refusals to 
licence does of course play a crucial role with this regards. This not just because of 
the compliance provision entailed in Section 60 of the Competition Act 1988 which 
makes the discussion within the EU framework applicable to domestic UK law. Even 
before this provision was enacted, courts and authorities have applied EC and EU 
principles to this matter.  
 
Generally, it can be said that a refusal to licence will be dealt with in the question of 
whether injunctive relief can be provided for an IP right holder in an infringement 
case. But defendants have also argued that the enforcement of an IP right, even where 
it is infringed, would be an abuse of a dominant position; thereby applying a violation 
of competition law on behalf of the right holder as a defence. These approaches have 
recently been in the spotlight in relation to the question as to how the refusal to li-
cence standard-essential patent could be abusive. Additionally, a refusal to licence can 
become relevant when a compulsory licence is being sought after by someone that can 
claim that a refusal to licence would constitute an abuse of a dominant position.  
 
2.4.1. The pre-Competition Act 1988 scenario 
 
Before the enactment of the Competition Act 1998, the assessment of whether a re-
fusal to licence would be anti-competitive was, inter alia, governed by the rules of the 
Fair Trading Act 1973. The former Monopolies and Mergers Commission was able to 
fully scrutinise the conduct of IP holders following a reference of the matter by the 
Secretary of State or the Director-General of the Office for Fair Trading68. Contrary to 
the current situation under the Chapter II prohibitions, there was previously “no provi-
 
68 The possibility to refer such issues to the Monopolies and Merges Commission by the OFT through 
its Director General was made possible by the Fair Trading Act 1973. Before, such references were 
only possible by the Secretary of State. 
DAC18684536/1   IPT-000039 
 
 
 Seite 15  
sion for deterrent effect, no prohibition to conduct as such and no effective sanc-
tions”69 as such against monopolies. Rather, the question that the Commission as-
sessed was whether the public interest was being harmed by the conduct of the IP 
right holder.  
 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission did not establish dominance by merely 
looking at the market of a patented product as such; rather it would look at the indus-
try as a whole.70 The Commission then presented its findings to the Secretary of State. 
Based on this, the Secretary of State would have a range of possibilities to remedy or 
prevent “the adverse effect specified in the report”.71 Section 90 (5) of the Fair Trad-
ing Act 1977 however prohibited some actions by the Secretary of State: It was not 
possible to prevent the patent holder from restraining infringement or to restrict the 
enforcement of a licence. Possible however was to seek relief through the provisions 
of the Patents Act through the Comptroller-General. Such orders included the possi-
bility to grant compulsory licences pursuant to the relevant provisions of the UK Pa-
tents Act 1977.72 
 
Korah states that the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission only seldom 
objected to firms obtaining and exploiting patents under the old Act.73 One case that is 
mentioned with respect to the practice of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
under the Fair Trading Act 1973, was the Indirect Electrostatic Reprographic Equip-
ment case.74 There, Xerox was held to have restricted competition by having estab-
 
69 Barry J Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EU and UK (5th edn, 
Routledge 2015) 128. 
70 Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 318.  
Later, the OFT has held that an firm’s conduct can still be considered a Chapter II prohibition of 
the Competition Act 1998 even if its market power is just based on the ownership of intellectual 
property rights - BSkyB, OFT decision of 17 December 2002 [340]. 
71 Section 56 (2) Fair Trading Act 1973. Such orders were however were not enforceable against for-
eigners - Section 90 Fair Trading Act 1973. 
72 infra 2.4.4. 
73 Korah adds that this is because it did not come to a finding that a patent would confer a dominant 
position as such - Valentine Korah, Competition Law of Britain and the Common Market (3rd edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982) 42; similarly: Richard Whish, Competition Law (2nd edn, But-
terworths 1989) 672. 
74 H.C. (1976 - 1977) 47. 
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lished a vast portfolio of patents over its technology which it did not intend to work 
while applying a very restrictive licensing policy. This was held to be against the pub-
lic interest as it served to maintain the monopoly position.75 Another case that was 
investigated by the Mergers and Monopolies Commission was the Chlordiazepoxide 
and Diazepam case.76 Here, the patents on tranquilizers were found to have permitted 
Hoffman- La Roche to make an excessive profit at the costs of the National Health 
Service.77 
 
2.4.2 The application of “Euro-Defences” 
After accession to the European Economic Community, so called “Euro-defences” 
were brought forward in IP infringement cases.78 A defendant would rely on the Trea-
ty principles of the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (or their respective preceding provi-
sions within the EC Treaty) by bringing forward that a positive finding of 
infringement would violate these competition principles. Commentators have been 
sceptical whether the EC Treaty would establish the grant of compulsory licenses 
based on the former Article 85(1) EC Treaty.79 But generally, it has been said that the 
courts in the United Kingdom would find a competition law defence as being admis-
sible.80  
 
75 In the case remedies were not applied as they were not deemed necessary as the United States have 
awarded compulsory licenses which would alleviate the issue. See generally - D.M. Raybould and 
Alison Firth, Law of Monopolies – Competition Practice in the USA, EEC, Germany and the UK 
(Graham & Trotman 1991) 474; Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust 
Policy in the UK and the EEC (Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 319; Valentine Korah, Competition Law 
of Britain and the Common Market (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982) 42. 
76 HCP (1972 - 1973) 197. Whish mentions that the decision has been criticised as it is the purpose to 
incentivise research and development by a monopoly right – Richard Whish, Competition Law (2nd 
edn, Butterworths 1989) 672.  
77 Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 319. 
78 ibid pp. 309. 
79 The European Commission argued in Kalwar/Plast Control v. Kabelmetal that a violation of Article 
85(1) of the EC Treaty by an exclusive license by the patent holder would not result in the defend-
ant being granted a compulsory license - Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: 
Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC (Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 317.  
80 Thomas Hoppner, “Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for a Compulsory 
Licence Defence under Article 102 TFEU” [European Competition Journal 2011] 298-299. See al-
so Merkin and Williams who, while being sceptical as to the scope of a “Euro-defence” still men-
tion that “the effect of compulsory licensing may be achieved by virtue of the direct effect in 
national law of Article 85(1).” -  Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust 
Policy in the UK and the EEC (Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 319. 
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Indeed, in many infringement cases the defendant has argued that the terms of the li-
censing proposed by the IP right holder would contravene Article 85 and 86 EEC 
Treaty (later Articles 81 & 83 of the EC Treaty; now Articles 101 & 102 TFEU).81 
Additionally, it has been brought forward that the refusal to licence would entail an 
abuse of a dominant position pursuant to Article 86 EC Treaty. These statements were 
often disregarded but have been held to be plausible by the Court of Appeal in British 
Leyland which involved the alleged infringement of copyright in spare parts: 
 
“[I]f English legislation … is used or abused by [the plaintiff] in a way and by means of ac-
tivities which themselves create a breach of the Treaty of Rome, then {the plaintiff] may not 
be able to obtain all the relief of which they would otherwise be entitled. If, for example, … 
the owners of English copyright were only prepared to grant a licence on terms which created, 
or helped to create, a breach of Community law, this court, I apprehend, would not grant an 
injunction against an infringer who desperately needed a licence for his business purposes and 
was willing to pay a reasonable royalty for that privilege… The court could award damages in 
lieu of an injunction based on a reasonable royalty…”82 
 
The Court also held that further use of the copyright protected work would depend on 
the payment of a reasonable royalty fee to the right holder. A similar approach to the 
grant of a compulsory licence would have also been possible based on Article 86 EC 
Treaty where no licence has been granted at first place. This has been also been un-
derlined by case law. In Intel v Via where the Vice Chancellor has held that it was 
“plain that if the conduct of [the plaintiff] is contrary to Art 82 (now Article 102 
TFEU; added by author) in the aspects alleged then such illegality may constitute a 
defence to any liability for infringement or any remedy therefore.”83The Supreme 
Court has recently delivered its decision in Oracle v M-Tech84 which some commen-
tators have regarded to possibly set an end to the availability to Euro-Defences.85 But 
 
81 Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Competition Law: Antitrust Policy in the UK and the EEC 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 310. 
82 British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v TI Silencers Ltd [1981] F.S.R. 2123, 217-218. Hoppner 
argues that the court has applied the legal principle of dolo agit in this decision - Thomas Hoppner, 
“Competition Law in Intellectual Property Litigation: The Case for a Compulsory Licence Defence 
under Article 102 TFEU” [European Competition Journal 2011] 299. 
83 Intel Corporation v Via Technologies Inc and Elitegroup Computer Systems [2003] EWCA Civ 
1905 [80]. 
84 Oracle America Inc (Formerly Sun Microsystems Inc) v M- Tech Data Ltd [2012] UKSC 27. 
85 See discussion in: Sara Warner, “Is there a role for Euro-Defences following Sun v M-Tech?” [Jour-
nal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 2013] 532-538. 
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just recently, such defences were raised again in an interim judgment and partly ac-
cepted by the Birss J with regards to standard essential patents.86 
 
While the availability of “Euro-Defences” may still be given, it needs to be said that 
in many cases such defences are raised unsuccessfully.87 While there might be a find-
ing of an abuse of dominance pursuant to Article 102 TFEU, this will not necessarily 
confer a valid defence against a claim for IP infringement as such. Courts have de-
manded a sufficient nexus between the claimant’s violation of competition law and 
the defendant.88 This means that in order to succeed with a “Euro-defence” the de-
fendant would need to convince the court that the abusive action was for instance 
conducted to harm the defendant.89 
 
2.4.3 Standard-Essential Patents 
The treatment of standard-essential patents (SEP) is increasingly becoming an issue 
for antitrust scrutiny. This has been highlighted by the developments after the Orange 
Book Standard decision by the German Federal High Court90 and very recently the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) decision in Huawei.91 The potential-
ly problematic aspect with regards to competition law is the fact that the inclusion of 
such a patent as a standard could incur a dominant position to the holder of that pa-
tent. Any refusal to licence such a patent could then possibly be considered to be 
abusing this dominant position. 
 
86 Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd & Ors [2015] EWHC 2097 
(Pat). 
87 Cole P G and Jones S F (eds), CIPA Guide to the Patent Act 1977 (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 
[61.33]; Nigel Jones, ‘Euro-defences: Magill distinguished’ [1998] EIPR 351. 
88 Guy Tritton, Tritton on Intellectual Property in Europe (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) [14-016]. 
89 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, OUP 2015) 348. 
90 FCJ, judgment of 6 May 2009, GRUR 2009, 694 – Orange Book-Standard; English translation , IIC 
2010, 369 - supra ?? (cross reference to German chapter). 
91 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH [2015] -  
supra ?? (cross reference to where the case is discussed). 
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Such SEPs, and particularly the negotiations with regards to FRAND92 licenses, have 
also been in the focus in the United Kingdom, albeit not in such prominent figures as 
in Germany.93 The IPCom saga has been an important set of cases with regards to the 
development of this area of the interface of IP and competition law. It however has to 
be noted that the developments relate to the question whether injunctive relief can be 
granted in a scenario where the refusal to licence would constitute an abuse of domi-
nance. There is so far not case with regards that an antitrust violation may be found 
with regards to failing FRAND commitments of holders of SEPs. 
Some words need to be mentioned to the practice of how injunctive relief is provided 
by English Courts. Importantly, injunctive relief is not automatic before British 
courts; it rather lies in the discretion of the judge to reward this remedy. The situation 
however needs to be distinguished between an interim injunction and final injunctive 
relief.94 In American Cynamid v Ethicon, the House of Lords has held that the claim-
ant in a patent infringement case would need to convince the court that there is a “se-
rious issue to be tried” for an interim injunction to be granted.95 Where certain 
circumstances are given, courts are able to provide for damages in substitution for in-
junctive relief. “[A] good working rule” when the judge has the discretion to grant 
damages in lieu of injunctive relief has been set out in the Shelfer decision by the 
Court of Appeal in the late 19th century:  
 
(1) if the injury to the [claimant’s] legal rights is small 
(2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money, 
(3) And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment, 
(4) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunc-
tion: -then damages in substitution for an injunction may be given.96 
 
 
92 FRAND stands for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory and relates to the rate of the licence fee 
that such SEPs ought to be licenced to anyone wishing to adopt the standard and by this make use 
of the SEP. 
93  See Jones, who states that this may relate to the fact that Germany has a bifurcated system and that 
“there is a strong legal tradition of providing security to IPR holders” - Alison Jones, “Standard-
Essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the Smartphone Wars”, [European 
Competition Journal 2014] 11. 
94 While injunctive relief is a discretionary remedy it has been said that a post-trial injunction will nor-
mally not be refused – Cole P G and Jones S F (eds), CIPA Guide to the Patent Act 1977 (7th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2011) [61.21] 
95  American Cynamid v Ethicon Ltd [1977] F.S.R. 593. 
96 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 (Court of Appeal). 
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While the Shelfer principles have been endorsed by the courts in IP cases, it has been 
said that there “would have to be a very strong case for an injunction to be with-
held.”97 Pumfrey J has held:  
“Accordingly, the grant or refusal of a final injunction is not merely a matter of the balance of 
convenience. Justice requires that the court observe the principles enunciated in Shelfer’s case 
and remembers that if the effect of the grant of an injunction is not oppressive the defendant 
cannot buy his way out of it, even if the price, objectively ascertained, would be modest. My 
understanding of the word ‘oppressive’ in this context is that the effect of the grant of the in-
junction would be grossly disproportionate to the right protected. The word ‘grossly’ avoids 
any suggestion that all that has to be done is to strike a balance of convenience.”98 
 
A notorious set of cases surrounding the issue of standard-essential patents has in-
volved IPCom. Here it has been shown that English Courts are not automatically 
granting injunctive relief where the allegedly infringed patent is essential to the 3G 
Telecommunication Standard. The cases relate to a complex set of litigation in rela-
tion to European Patent 1 841 268, a divisional of the patent EP 186 189 also involv-
ing the courts in England and the Technical Board of Appeal at the EPO. IPCom 
acquired the 268 patent among others from Bosch. Following an investigation by the 
European Commission, IPCom agreed to uphold the FRAND commitments that 
Bosch initially abided to. 99 IPCom sued Nokia and HTC for infringement while the 
defendants argued that the 268 patent should be revoked.  
 
With regards to the question whether injunctive relief should be granted Roth J has 
declined to grant this remedy against Nokia. 100 The judge held:   
 
“I have to say in those circumstances I am very uncertain, to put it mildly, to see why a per-
manent injunction should be granted in this case at all or indeed any injunction. It seems to me 
a classic case for consideration of the Shelfer criteria, given those circumstances. You are 
willing to give a licence. Nokia wants a licence. You cannot agree on the terms. They will be 
determined. There will then be a licence. In those circumstances for a non-trading entity to get 
an injunction seems to me quite extraordinary. That has been raised in the written arguments. 
It seems to me that is the area which I would like you to address me because that may resolve 
 
97 Virgin Atlantic v Premium Aircraft [2010] F.S.R. 15 [24]. 
98 Navitaire Inc v EasyJet (No 2) [2006] R.P.C. 4, 213, 250. 
99 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission welcomes IPCom's public FRAND declaration, Press 
release 10th December 2009 (MEMO/09/549) -  
< http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-549_en.htm> last accessed: 21.11.2015. 
100 IPCom V Nokia [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch). 
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this matter quite apart from all these difficult questions of what the different German judg-
ments mean and which principles of res judicata should be applied. It comes down then to the 
discretion of this court whether it is appropriate to grant an injunction at all.”101 
 
Importantly, Nokia brought forward that it would be happy to take a licence on 
FRAND terms while IPCom was prepared to grant a licence under such circumstanc-
es. The issue at hand related to the terms and rates of such licence. Roth J ordered a 
separate trial to be heard with regards to the FRAND terms. Importantly, while this 
case involved a non-practicing enterprise (NPE) as claimant it cannot be said that in-
junctive relief would have been provided if the claimant had been a practicing entity. 
Rather, the equitable approach as provided by Shelfer will be reverted to.102 
 
 
Defendants have continued to raise FRAND issues against the claim of patent in-
fringement.  In Vringo v ZTE, the High Court of England and Wales dealt with a set of 
cases which related to patents that have been declared as essential by the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Most of the patents in the portfolio 
of Vringo have been obtained from Nokia103. Vringo was obliged (and willing) to 
commit to its FRAND duties which ETSI’s IP policy mandates. ZTE was willing to 
accept a licence on FRAND terms where a patent is found valid and infringed. In the 
case management conference104, the claimant Vringo sought to have the issue with 
regards to the FRAND issues being decided first while the defendant ZTE wanted the 
issues of validity and infringement of the patents in suit to take priority. 
 
 
101 IPCom V Nokia [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch).  
102 By perceiving a parallel approach by courts in the US and England, Peritz states that “there is grow-
ing trans-Atlantic consensus that injunctions should be denied in SEP cases if certain requirements 
are fulfilled.” – Rudolph J.R. Peritz, ‘Intellectual property rights: from state-initiated restraints of 
competition to state-initiated competition’ in Josef Drexl and Vicente Bagnoli (eds), State-Initiated 
Restraints of Competition (Edward Elgar 2015) 273.  
103 In a subsequent decision relating to the substantial patent issue it was held that ZTE considered 
Vringo to be “patent trolls”. But ZTE did not raise any defences based on competition law with 
this regard - Vringo Infrastructure Inc v ZTE (UK) Ltd [2014] EWHC 3924 (Pat) [4]. 
104 Vringo Infrastructure, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., et. al., [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat). 
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Birss J held that it would be necessary to first assess the validity of the patent rather 
than the FRAND issues. While the court did not specifically discuss whether or not to 
grant injunctive relief, it stated: 
“There is what I will call a general idea (without expressing a view on whether it is right or 
wrong) that when a patent is an SEP, if a defendant is a willing licensee, then it may be that 
the patentee is not entitled to obtain an injunction against the defendant, whereas if the de-
fendant was not a willing licensee, then the defendant may be subject to the risk of an injunc-
tion. [...]105 
Birss J continues by stating: “In my judgment, a defendant accused of patent in-
fringement by a patentee who claims to have a standards essential patent is and must 
be entitled to say, "I wish to know if this patent is valid or infringed or not before I 
take a licence". Such a stance cannot fairly be described as unwillingness.”106 The 
case shows a willingness of the courts in England to generally deal with FRAND and 
adjudicate on the rates.107 The case to deal with the FRAND issues is due to take 
place in 2016.108 
A very recent case involving standard-essential patents was Unwired Planet v 
Huawei.109 Unwired Planet, a NPE, acquired a large portfolio of patents essential to 
smart phone and network equipment technology from Ericsson in 2013.  Samsung, 
Google and Huawei were sued for patent infringement. While arguing that the patents 
in suit were neither valid nor infringed, they stated that they would be willing FRAND 
licensees if the patents were found to be valid and infringed. The defendants also 
raised “Euro-defences” based on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
Birss J struck down the defence raised with regards to Article 101 TFEU. Samsung 
argued, inter alia, that Ericsson’s original commitment to its FRAND declaration 
would be circumvented by transferring the patents to the NPE and that this would not 
ensure that third parties would be able to enforce the FRAND obligations against Un-
 
105 Vringo Infrastructure, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., et. al., [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat). [43]. 
106 ibid [44]. 
107 See also - Alison Jones, “Standard-Essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the 
Smartphone Wars”, [European Competition Journal 2014] comment in footnote 128. 
108 Vringo Infrastructure Inc v ZTE (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat) [101]. 
109 Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited et al, High Court of Jus-
tice, Patents Court, London, UK, 21 July 2015, Case No. [2015] EWHC 2097 (Pat). 
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wired. The Court however held that the FRAND declarations provided by Unwired 
Planet would be sufficient and hence would not violate Article 101 TFEU. 
 
While this defence was ruled out, Birss J held that other defences could be more plau-
sible. This was based on the fact the particular relationship between Unwired Planet 
and Ericsson. In the initial Master Sale Agreement (MSA), Ericsson shared revenues 
generated by the NPE through licensing the patents. Unwired as a NPE, so the Court, 
enabled it to “act more aggressively, threaten and sue putative licensees with no ad-
verse consequences, reputational or otherwise.  It has no products and so is not inter-
ested in cross-licenses.”110 While the Court held that the Ericcson was able to 
generate income by transferring their patents to Unwired Planet,111 what led the court 
to refuse to strike down this issue in the summary judgment was the particular con-
stellation created by the MSA. By referring to an academic publication related to the 
case, Birss J held “that competition law issues can arise when a practicing entity (such 
as Ericsson) transfers patents to what the authors call a "hybrid NPE", which is an 
NPE which maintains a contractual relationship with a practising entity (and so would 
include Unwired Planet).”112  
 
He concluded that “[t]he relationship between standards essential patents, FRAND, 
NPEs and competition law is a developing one. It is an important area in the context 
of telecommunications technology. There are very few cases which deal with it and 
that adds to my reluctance to strike out a fact sensitive issue like this one.”113 Hence, 
the judge held that the issue could not be heard as a summary judgment and ought to 
go to trial. The proceedings of this issue will presumably tale place in October 
2016.114   
 
 
110 Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited et al, [2015] EWHC 
2097 (Pat) [40]. 
111 The Court held that Ericsson’s pursuit to generate more income from its patents was not a sin – ibid 
[47]. 
112 Unwired Planet International Limited v Huawei Technologies Co. Limited et al, [2015] EWHC 
2097 (Pat) [42]. 
113 ibid [48]. 
114 Lorna Brazell and Zoë Hare, ‘FRAND war: what is it good for?’ [2015] Intellectual Property Maga-
zine] 66. 
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 2.4.4 Compulsory licensing under the UK Patents Act 1977 
Aside from raising the abuse of dominance as a defence in an infringement case, a 
compulsory license could alternatively be sought. The UK Patents Act 1977, for in-
stance, provides for various reasons that could entail compulsory licensing.115 For the 
purposes of this chapter, Sections 50A and 51 is of particular importance. Section 50A 
Patents Act 1977 outlines the powers provided to the Comptroller General following 
merger and market investigations. Section 51 Patents Act 1977 discusses these powers 
following a report of the Competition Commission (i.e. now the CMA) putting for-
ward certain anti-competitive actions. Such instances can occur where a person (i.e. 
the patent holder) is engaged with an anti-competitive practice (Section 51 (1) (c) UK 
Patents Act 1977).  
 
The compulsory licensing provisions have however not been used frequently. Liu 
mentions that “[b]etween 1959–1968, an average of 1.5 applications per year for 
compulsory licenses were filed under the general provisions of the Patents Act; only 
two were granted.”116  Furthermore, the UK Intellectual Property Office has recently 
published a brief report on the number of granted compulsory licences.117 The report 
underlines Liu’s findings that compulsory licenses are only rarely applied for.118 It 
relates this to the deterring effect that the provisions have so that voluntary licensing 
is achieved beforehand.119 
 
115 See also section 144 of the CDPA 1988 and also the provisions within the CDPA 1988 that ensures 
interoperability as required by Articles 6 of the Software Directive (Directive 2009/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer pro-
grams). 
It can also be seen that the British legislator is willing to address potentially abusive scenario by intro-
ducing new legislation. In the aftermath of the Magill decision (Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-
242/91 P. Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. 
Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR I-743), Article 176 of the Broadcasting 
Act was inserted to ensure that information with regards to TV programmes are not withheld to 
people wishing to publish them within the United Kingdom. 
116 Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Rationalising the Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing by the Essential Facil-
ities Doctrine’ [2008] IIC 757, 759. 
117 UK Intellectual Property Office, FOI release: Compulsory patent licences (20 February 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/404696/ipo-foi-2014-
425-compulsory-licences.pdf> Last accessed: 24.11.2015 
118 ibid. 
119 ibid. 
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3. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND DELIMITATION AGREEMENTS 
While generally being considered to be beneficial, settlements of disputes relating to 
IP rights can also fall under the scrutiny of the Competition rules. This is because they 
may entail contractual restraints which are “substantially wider in scope and effect 
than the potentially exclusionary effect of the IPR.”120 
A very prominent case that was decided in relation to the delimitation of trade marks 
was Apple Corp Ltd v Apple Computer Inc.121 The former party related to the entity 
managing the business affairs of the Beatles. The latter party related to the well-
known computer company. Apple Corp was largely focussed on the music sectors 
while Apple Computer Inc. initially focussed on computers as their main field of op-
erations.  Since computers became increasingly more able to play and perform music 
both companies agreed to set up a delimitation agreement with regards to the fields of 
operations which contained a no-challenge clause.  
However, Apple Inc. subsequently argued that the agreement imposed an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade hence being void. With regards to a violation of Article 85 EC 
Treaty (now Article 101 TFEU) the Court of Appeal found that the assessment does 
not differ to that surrounding the claim based on restraint of trade.122 It relied on Eu-
ropean precedents123 and held in relation to the case at hand:  
“In the present case that approach dictates an investigation of what, in fact, was the scope of 
the parties' business in 1981 and what was the use being made by them of their respective ver-
sions of the APPLE name and the apple device. An agreement which, having regard to the na-
ture and extent of their businesses and their use of the confusingly similar marks, does no 
more than avoid confusion or conflict between the parties is useful and lawful. Such an 
agreement would not be one whose object or effect was to distort 'competition.' In this regard, 
under Community law as much as under English law, the cancellation issue is irrelevant. The 
plaintiffs' case is not stronger because under one law, say, Danish law, their registrations were 
impregnable, or weaker because under the law of another member-State, say, Germany, their 
registrations were vulnerable. What is material is what was actually happening on the ground, 
not what was the plaintiffs' entitlement to effect or maintain registrations under particular na-
tional trade mark laws. Accordingly, under Community law as under English law, time and 
money should not be spent and wasted on an investigation, with the assistance of foreign law-
 
120 Guy Tritton, Tritton on Intellectual Property in Europe (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) [8-159]. 
121 Apple Corp Ltd v Apple Computer Inc [1991] C.M.L.R. 49, CA. 
122 ibid [109]. 
123 Case 35/83 BAT v. E.C. Commission [1985] E.C.R. 363. 
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yers, of what are the national requirements for the registration or cancellation of trade 
marks.”124 
 
More recently, the World Wildlife Fund v World Wrestling Federation cases125 related 
to the settlement of the dispute of both parties on the use of the initials “WWF”. 
While admitting the violation of a settlement in relation to the disputed initials, the 
Federation argued that the settlement agreement would violate the common law prin-
ciple of restraint of trade.126 Such an agreement is void unless it can be justified by the 
Fund. The Court of Appeal approved of finding of the first instance court that the va-
lidity of the agreement was upheld. The appellate court also endorsed the test as-
sessing the unreasonableness of the restraint that Jacob J, as he then was, developed in 
the first instance trial: 
 
“Thus a restraint imposed by an intellectual property dispute settlement should only be re-
garded as falling within the restraint of trade doctrine (and thus require justification) if the re-
strained party can show that:  
(a) the restraint actually imposes a real fetter on his trade; and  
(b) the restraint goes beyond any reasonably arguable scope of protection of the intellectual 
property right in issue. 
If the restrainee can show that, the restrainor may nonetheless justify by showing: 
(c) that the restraint nonetheless provides a protection which he reasonably needs.  
I add (c) because there may be cases where the restrainor can justify the restraint independent-
ly of or in conjunction with any intellectual property right. The ultimate question is whether 
the restraint is reasonable in all the circumstances. The restrainor's intellectual property rights 
are not necessarily the sole determinant of this.”127 
 
 
124 Apple Corp Ltd v Apple Computer Inc [1991] 3. C.M.L.R. 49, CA [112]. 
125 WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2002] F.S.R. 
33 (Court of Appeal); WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Enter-
tainment Inc. [2002] F.S.R. 32 (High Court of England and Wales). 
126 A violation of Article 81 of the EC Treaty was also argued - ibid [1]. 
127  WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2002] F.S.R. 
32 [28]. 
